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Abstract
Using the characteristics and the demands of the recent uprisings in the Middle East
and North Africa or so called “Arab Spring,” this study questions the significance of
some propositions deduced from Huntington’ popular theory of “The Clash of
Civilizations.” The research asserts that globalization, especially the development of
new technology, has created opportunities for the new generations in the region to be
acculturated with a set of values reflecting their basic civilian and human rights. The
new values, while credited with the development in the West, belong to all human
beings and are gaining the status of universal human culture. The development of this
universal culture undermines Huntington’s clash of civilizations. The paper ends with
an explanation of why Huntington puts his emphasis on “clashes,” rather than a
“universal culture” or “alliance” of cultures.
Keywords

Human Rights, Clash of Civilizations, Universal Cultural, Arab Spring
Samuel Huntington was one of the most popular but
controversial American social scientists, especially among scholars
involved with the issue of culture and/or global socio-political
changes. Since the publication of his book, The Clash of Civilizations,
literally hundreds, probably thousands of books or papers have been
published, and conferences or speeches have been assembled to cover
the validity and significance of the “Clash of Civilizations.” The
theory, originally published as an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993, was
mostly dismissed by the intellectual community, but after the
September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, “Huntington’s
triumph” started and “The Clash of Civilizations” became the New
York Times bestseller book (Abrahamian 2003). In interviews with
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Media, for example Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (August 18,
2006), Huntington said the 9/11 event confirmed the clash of cultures
and civilizations.1 His critiques, however, disagree with his underlying
theoretical assumptions. For example, Edward Said (2001) has
confronted the notion of fixed civilizations and puts more emphasis
on the dynamics and interdependence of most civilizations.2 Fred
Halliday, a British Middle Eastern specialist, portrays the theory as
extremism supported by anti-modernists and fundamentalists because
“East and West” for them are separate and they “are all distinct and
there will inevitably be conflict” (2002:194). He explains political
tensions between the Muslims and the West by international politics
of the West, especially in the Middle East between USA-Israel
dissention with Muslims over Palestine as the main cause of the 9/11
terrorism (2001).3 One can have the same impression from
Brzezinski’s strategic vision on “America’s stake in a constructive
resolution of Israel-Palestinian conflict. This conflict poisons the
atmosphere of the Middle East, contributes to Muslim extremism, and
is directly damaging to American national interests” (2012:124).
Michael Dunn characterized the clash of civilizations as the ideology
of conservatives on both sides, i.e., Al-Qaeda or fundamentalist
Muslims and neo-conservatives in the West. “Clearly, the creation of a
discourse that portrays ‘Islam’ on the one hand and ‘the West’ on the
other is… beneficial to the leaders of Islamic militant groups” (20067:5). Finally, “Clashes of Civilizations” entails to assume a civilization
as the unit of analysis while underestimating the clashes within a
civilization; there are fundamental disagreements among the Muslim
communities themselves, for example between Shias and Sunnis, on
the meaning of “Islamic Culture,” which is at the center of
Huntington’s theory.
The recent regional Muslim uprisings in the Middle East and
North Africa, or so called “Arab Spring,” have developed new realities
upon which sociologists can assess variety of the theories and/or
propositions conceptualized in several sociological fields, such as
social change and revolution, political sociology, cultural universalism,
social identity, and so on. Unlike the September 11/2001 event, the
regional Muslim uprisings challenge the validity of Huntington’s
theory and demand more robust propositions to explain sociopolitical clashes on national and international levels. This paper, using
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qualitative data (such as the characteristics of the uprisings and their
public demands, citations from reporters and Middle Eastern experts,
etc.) argues against the “clashes” of civilizations as the major source of
conflicts in the post Cold-War era. Rather, it underlines the power of
an emerging universal human culture (set of values) composed of
basic human and civil rights without ignoring the importance of native
cultures. This newly development human culture as expressed today,
regardless of its historical roots, emerged from the Post-World War II
human and civil right discourses (Donnelly 1989).The response of the
Muslim world to this newly developed culture, unlike Huntington’s
view in the “Clash of Civilizations,” has been very mixed from
assimilation to confrontation.4 Most extreme Muslims such as AlQaeda and Taliban, rejecting the Western culture including human
rights, offer the Sharia law as the only alternative. Others, especially
educated people such as Wafa Sultan, the Arab-American author of A
God Who Hates (2011) or Abdel-Samad, an Egypt-German author and
journalist (2010), considers human rights as the values of all human
beings. The research rests on the awakening idea in the Muslim world,
especially among the new generation, directed against their states failed to
resolve their socio-economic problems while suppressing their human
rights. First, the author argues the newly developed human culture was
underestimated in Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations.”
Furthermore, putting more emphasis on human dignity as the cause
or incentive behind the regional socio-political uprisings, the research
challenges Huntington’s “cultural identity” as the driving force behind
the clashes of civilizations. Finally, the paper addresses why
Huntington comes to clash, rather than alliance of cultures, more
specifically between Islam and the West. But first, a brief review of
“The Clash of Civilizations” and a short background of the regional
Muslim uprisings, upon which the shortcomings of Huntington’s
theory would be assessed.
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
In response to Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History
and the Last Man, published in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and inspired by Bernard Lewis’ article, “The Roots of Muslim
Rage,” published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1990, Samuel Huntington
proposed the clashes of religions, especially between Muslims and the
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West, under the “Clash of Civilizations” as the primary source of
international conflicts in the Post-Cold War era. The central theme of
the book, as Huntington says, “…is that culture and cultural identities,
which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the
patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the Post-Cold
world” (1996:20).
Before Huntington’s paradigm, Bernard Lewis (1990)
theorized the “Roots of Muslim Rage” against the Western
Civilization in his article and later developed it in his book, Islam and
the West (1993). According to Lewis, Muslims in clash with Western
Civilization have “suffered from three successive stages of defeats.”
During the first stage, they lost their domination in the world to the
advancing power of the West. Then, it was the era in which the
Muslims’ authority was undermined in their own countries, “through
an invasion of foreign ideas and ways of life.” Finally, “their mastery
in their own houses was challenged by their emancipated women to
rebellious children…It was too much to endure, and the outbreak of
rage against these alien and infidel forces was inevitable” (1990:49).
Huntington elaborated and expanded Bernard Lewis’ theory
to large-scale conflicts in the Post-Cold War era among seven to eight
major civilizations, especially between the West and “non-West.” He
argues that the fundamental source of conflicts in the Post–Cold War
era would not be primarily ideological but cultural between different
civilizations. Since the people of different civilizations have different
views on their social relationships, for example, between citizens and
state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as different
views of “rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and
hierarchy” (1993:25). These differences are the products of centuries
and will not soon disappear. In these conflicts, Huntington adds, the
key question is not “Which side were you on” as it was during the ColdWar within which people could choose and change the sides. In
conflicts between civilizations, the question is “What are you?” The
answer for this question cannot be easily changed. Now the
international issues are “between Western and Islamic civilizations has
been going on for 1,300 years and it would unlikely to
cease” (1993:31).
While Huntington identifies seven to eight civilizations, the
core of the clashes in the book is limited to between the West and
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“the rest,” specifically between the United States and the Islamic
culture. He says “the underlying problem for the West is not the
Islamic fundamentalism. Rather, it is Islam, a different civilization whose
people is convinced of the superiority of their cultural identity and is
obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (1996:217, emphasis
added). He specifies five factors intensified the conflicts between
Islam and the West in the Twentieth Century:
First, Muslim population growth which
has generated large numbers of unemployed and
disaffected young people who become recruits to
Islamist causes, exert pressure on neighboring
societies, and migrate to the West. Second, the
Islamic Resurgence has given Muslims a renewed
confidence in the distinctive character and worth
of their civilization and values compared to those
of the West. Third, the West’s simultaneous
efforts to universalize its values and institutions, to
maintain its military and economic superiority, and
to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world
generate intense resentment among Muslims.
Fourth, the collapse of communism removed the
common enemy of the West and Islam and left
each the perceived major threat to the other. Fifth,
the increasing contacts between Muslims and
Westerners stimulate in each a new sense of their
own identity and how it differs from that of the
other. Interaction and intermingling also
exacerbate differences over the rights of members
of civilization in a country dominated by members
of the other civilization. Within both Muslim and
Christian societies, tolerance for the other
declined sharply in the 1980s and 1990s.
(1996:211).
THE “ARAB SPRING”
The movements apparently started in Tunisia on December
17, 2010, when a young man, Mohammad Bouazizi, set himself on
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fire in front of a local municipal office because the police confiscated
his card and beat him the day before, and his complaint was ignored.
Before the Tunisian uprising, however, the Islamic Republic of Iran
experienced its own public uprising, called the “green movement”
after the disputed presidential election in June 12, 2009. Iranians are
not Arab but a majority are Muslim. However, like the other MiddleEastern and North-African nations, the Iranians have suffered from
authoritarian and tyrannical regimes for many decades. The uprising
was peaceful and the public demand was simple; “where is my vote?”
They were asking for nullification of the official results which were
rigged, based on many reliable reports. For example, Hooman Majd,
author and an observer of the events, reported that “the Green
Movement.., led by the reformists but also a spontaneous creation of
its own—a sort of immaculate conception of the political kind—was
Iran’s first real civil rights movement, one not so unlike the civil rights
movement in the United States a short half-century ago” (2010:43).
He adds:
Iranians came out onto the street—
young, old, bearded, clean-shaven, chador-clad,
pious, secular, and Chanel-wearing fashionistas for
all to see, to register their disapproval of what they
believed to be a rigged vote, an insult to every
Iranian who believed that the one truly democratic
aspect of their system had been rudely violated
(54).5
Some Middle Eastern experts agree that the Iranian green
movement has inspired the Arab uprisings, and their success, in turn,
further encourages and sustains the Iranian democracy-seekers.6 While
the Iranian regime suppressed the uprising by arresting, torturing, and
killing hundreds of activists and called them “proxy of foreign foes,”
the oppositions are still alive, and according to Christian Science Monitor
(June 2011) “the movement has achieved its goal by gaining high
moral ground, revealing the true face of the Islamic Regime, and
draining away much of its political legitimacy.”7 However, unlike the
suppressed Iranian green movement, the uprising in Tunisia was
successful and inspired new waves of unrest in some other Muslim
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nations, such as Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Bahrain, and
Syria.
In Tunisia, small demonstrations started in Bouazizi’s
hometown and spread throughout the country. While desperate selfsacrifice highlighted public frustration over living standards and
economic inequality, the core of protests however were against police
brutality, official unaccountability, lack of transparency, and
suppressed civilian and human rights. For example, Dalacoura
reported one of the popular protest chants: “We can live on bread and
water alone but not with RCD [Ben Ali’s ruling party]” (2012:67).8
The outcome of Tunisia’s uprising has been cautiously promising
since the moderate Islamic party, Ennahda with a shrewd leader, AlGhannouchi, made a coalition government with secular parties and
openly rejected the Iranian type of Islamic Republic. According to
Esam Al-Amin (2011), a writer and journalist, “Tunisian people have
sent an unambiguous message that they want moderate Islamists and
secularists to work together in establishing democratic governance and
building a just socio-economic system, while preserving hard-won
freedoms and liberties, as well as respecting human rights and the
Arab-Islamic identity of Tunisia.”9
In Egypt, following the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the
uprising started in Cairo and spread throughout the country. The
demonstrations were peaceful and the demands mostly addressed on
the economic hardship and inequality while the chants were focused
on democracy, freedom, and human rights. Like Tunisia, the Mubarak
regime attempted to crash the uprising but failed since the opposition
was mostly united, regardless of their religions. For instance,
according to Aljazeera reports, Christians were protecting Muslims at
the Friday prayers and the Muslims did the same for the Christians on
the following Sunday.10 The prospect for democracy and human rights
in Egypt is mixed. Some believe the Middle East in general is
“immune” to “democratization.” Others are cautiously optimistic.
Ajami, a Middle-Eastern specialist and a Lebanese’s-American fellow
in the Hoover Institute, says a “plausible division of spoils and
responsibility might give the [Islamic] Brotherhood the domains of
governance dearest to it—education, social welfare, and the
judiciary—with the military getting defense…Liberal secularists would
have large numbers, a say in the rhythm of daily life in a country so
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hard to regiment and organize, and the chance to field a compelling
potential leader in a future presidential election”(2012:4).11 The unity
and technocratic government of Prime Minister Hisham Qandidl and
the recent public criticism and demonstrations against the
undemocratic Islamist elements of the newly written constitution
mainly support such an optimism.
In Libya, Qaddafi ruled the country since 1969 as a military
dictator. He repressed the basic rights of his citizens and ruthlessly
crushed dissidents. According to Billingsley, “Libya has no history of
rule of law and no experience with a competitive political process.
Sharia was the formal basis of law and was frequently applied to
matters of family law...the regime tended to wield power arbitrarily,
with little attempt to cloak its actions in legal cover” (2011:4). He also
adds that “Libya’s draft constitutional charter…is encouraging. The
document prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, religion,
and political opinions. The charter also guarantees women ‘all
opportunities’ to participate in the political, economic, and social
spheres” (2011:4).12
By the end of 2011, three governments had been
overthrown—Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, and Gaddafi in
Libya; more recently, in early 2012, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. The
Syrian regime has killed more than 60,000 of its citizens based on the
recent United Nations report.13 The UN Secretary General, Ban
Ki-moon who has spoken several times with Bashar Al-Assad, the
Syrian president, condemned the continuing violence of the regime
against the peaceful demonstrations, most particularly the use of tank
and live fire that killed and injured thousands of people. Meanwhile,
some other Arab leaders, understanding the nature of public demands
and the escalation of the uprisings, such as King Abdullah in Jordan
and King Mohammad VI in Morocco, have made significant political
and social reforms in their constitutions and thereby in their
governments. For example, King Abdullah dismissed unpopular
Samir Rifai’s government and asked Marouf-al-Bakhit to form a new
government with the purpose of reforms and newly proposed
constitutional amendments. In Morocco, the king had appointed a
committee to revise the constitution which was approved in a
referendum on June 30, 2011.
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Overall, many observers and reporters agree that the
protesters have represented a broad coalition of poor and middle
classes, Muslims and Christians, men and women, especially young
generations who have access to internet and new mass media. While it
is hard to generalize, anti-West, anti-American, and even anti-Israeli
slogans were absent in the uprisings. Indeed, as Dalacoura (2012)
reported, the most demands were firmly on national issues, political
and economic, not primarily on Arabism and Islam. Paul Salam
(2011), the director of Carnegie Middle Eastern Center in Beirut, in an
interview with “Hurriyet Daily News” stressed:
Now we are entering a new era. We had
the era where political Islam in a non-democratic,
often violent, format was the proposed solution.
This is the era where democratization is the key.
Political Islam is coming under the context and
conditions of a democracy. And obviously the
Turkish example of a party with Islamic roots
successful in a democratic state is the most
attractive model for the states that have been
through a revolution (2011:2).14
The common denominators of the uprisings can be classified
under the features or characteristics of the uprisings and the major
public demands. With regard to the characteristics, the uprisings were
launched and organized mostly by youths; the Internet (Facebook,
Twitter, Mobile-phone, YouTube, etc.) played significant roles in
organizing the unrests and the satellite, especially the Qatari-based AlJazeera, on broadcasting the events; finally, the uprisings have been
initially peaceful and civilized, while extremism, violence, and terrorism
were condemned. On the public demands, the emphases have been
on economic and employment opportunities; asking for governmental
accountability and opposing to corruption; demanding the rules of law
with respect to freedom, democracy, and human rights.
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CLASHES OF CULTURES OR TENDENCY TOWARD A
UNIVERSAL CULTURE
Huntington minimizes the emergence of a universal culture, a
set of values reflecting basic human and civil rights, since the “central
elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion.”
Therefore, a universal civilization requires a global culture with a
universal religion and language. He adds, “If a universal civilization is
emerging, there should be tendencies towards the emergence of a
universal language and a universal religion” (1996:59). No evidence
exists to support that English or any other languages have been
gaining the universal status since “throughout history the distribution
of languages in the world has reflected the distribution of power in the
world” (1996:62). The same is correct about a “universal” religion.
The “data do show increase in the proportions of the world
population adhering to the two major proselytizing religions, Islam
and Christianity, over eighty years” (1996:65).15 Therefore, “universalism
is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures
[emphasis added].” The “most enthusiastic proponents of the single civilization
idea are intellectual migrants to the West…for whom the concept provides a highly
satisfying answer to the central question: Who am I?” (1996:66) [Emphasis
added].
The regional uprisings and their public demands are not
consistent with Huntington’s “non-universal human culture”
proposition. For example, Tawakkol Abdel-Salam Karman, a Yemeni
activist in the uprisings who later became one of the three Nobel
Peace Prize winners in 2011, summed up the characteristics of the
uprisings and the major public demands in her Nobel Prize acceptance
speech. She started her speech with “[i]n the name of God the
Compassionate the Merciful” and added:
At this moment, as I speak to you here,
young Arab people, both women and men, march
in peaceful demonstrations demanding freedom
and dignity…The Arab people who are revolting
in a peaceful and civilized manner have, for so
many decades, been oppressed and suppressed by
the regimes of authoritarian tyrants who have
indulged themselves deeply in corruption and in
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looting the wealth of their people…The people
have decided to break free and walk in the
footsteps of civilized free people of the world…
Our youth revolution is peaceful and popular and
is motivated by a just cause, and has just demands
and legitimate objectives, which fully meet all
divine laws, secular conventions and charters of
international human rights…peace, human
coexistence, fight against corruption and
organized crime, war on terrorism, and resistance
to violence, extremism and dictatorship, …and are
cherished by the whole international community.
The revolutions of the Arab spring in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and other Arab
countries,…in terms of motivation, driving power
and objectives, didn’t take place on isolated
islands cut off from all the rapid and astonishing
developments and changes which our world is
witnessing. The Arab people have woken up just
to see how poor a share of freedom, democracy
and dignity they have… This experience is
somewhat similar to the spring that swept
throughout Eastern Europe after the downfall of
the Soviet Union.16
Tawakkol’s speech, reflecting the uprising characteristics and
demands, does not confirm Huntington’s proposition that universal
culture is the “ideology of the West” to confront non-Western
cultures. Freedom, democracy, and human rights in general, while
credited with development in the West, belong to all human beings.
They have gained the status of “cultural universals” in sociology. The
people in the region, like Tawakkol, are not intellectual migrants to the
West who are looking for a satisfying answer for “Who am I.” Rather,
they are ordinary citizens who ask for their civil and human rights in
their own nations. Second, the people in the region, like all the citizens in
the international community, have started their peaceful uprising
against governmental corruption and asking for democraticallyelected, accountable governments that respect their human and
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civilian rights. All the uprisings originally rejected extremism and
demanded their rights in a civilized manner; as Tawakkol expressed
in her speech, they rejected extremism and followed the civilian
means to achieve their civil goals. Finally, while Tawakkol did not
ignore her “Islamic identity” when she started her acceptance speech
with an Islamic phrase and her hair covered, but she did not ask for
an Islamic government or Sharia law, rather, she underlined their
human and civil rights. The same have been reported among the
other groups, including the Islamists, such as the Islamic
Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia.17 Dalacoura comes to
the same conclusion that “[n]one of the uprisings was led by an
Islamic movement or posited a demand for an Islamic state; if
anything, they were post-ideological, patriotic and ‘introverted’ in the
sense of being focused on internal national politics” (2012:79). Thus,
Samuel Huntington’s reductionism of civilization to religion leads
him to overemphasize the conflicting elements of Western and
Muslim cultures while ignoring/underestimating the power of the
shared and evolving universal civil and human values which have
been enhanced in universal culture.
THE DRIVING FORCE: HUMAN DIGNITY OR CULTURAL
IDENTITY
The driving force behind the clashes of civilizations is
“cultural identity” as the answer to “who am I?” Huntington says
“identity almost always is defined by religion.” Religion,
psychologically, provides the most reassuring and supportive identity
during rapid social transformation. “Religion provides compelling
answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to
replace those lost through urbanization…Religions give people
identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and
nonbelievers, between superior in-group and a different and inferior
out-group” (1996 97). Huntington adds that the new generation of
Muslim is not going to be necessarily “fundamentalists but will be
much more committed to Islam than their predecessors… As a
result, the early years of the twenty first century are likely to see an
ongoing resurgence of non-Western power and culture and the clash
of the peoples of non-West civilization with the West” (1996:121),
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especially between Islam and the West. Thus, following Huntington’s
proposition, “Islamic identity” is and should be the driving force,
especially among young Muslims, for socio-political changes at the
national or international levels.
The public demands in the uprisings have not been in
agreement with his “cultural identity” proposition either. Emphases in
human rights and human dignity, rather than Islamic identity, were the
major demands in all the uprisings. Three activists in the regional
uprisings, who were later announced winners of Roland Berger
Human Dignity Award in Berlin and shared their EUR 1 million
award in November 2011, did not mention their cultural identity as
their driving force in the uprisings. Rather, they emphasized human
dignity and human rights in the acceptance speeches—Ms. Radhia
Nasraoui from Tunisia (the founder of the Association for the Fight
Against Torture in Tunisia); Gamal Eid from Egypt (the founder of
the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ANHRI), and
Mr. Mazen Darwish from Syria (the founder of the Syrian Center for
Media and Freedom of Expression—SCM). Gamal Eid, for example,
said “I am extremely proud to be honored together with two of the
greatest human rights campaigners in the Arab world. I have devoted
myself to this task because I firmly believe human rights activists need
to focus on supporting the people who live under repression and
desire nothing more than to live in democracy.” Mazen Darwish said
“History teaches us the price of freedom may be high; but the price of
tyranny is even higher… to date more than 4000 Syrian (women, men,
and children) have paid for road to freedom with their lives after
overcoming the barrier of fear…”18 Marquand, the Christian Science
Monitor staff writer, conceived “human dignity” as the major search at
the heart of the “Arab Spring.” He wrote, Qaddafi asked “Libyans to
rely on his ‘moral authority’- a request that ever more sophisticated
Arab generations widely read as an insult to their intelligence.”
“Eating bread is no longer enough. They want bread, liberty, and
dignity. Is that too much to ask?” (2011). Hillary Clinton, the Secretary
of the United States said in Geneva, February 28, 2011: “We see in
their struggles a universal yearning for dignity and respect. And they
remind us that the power of human dignity is always underestimated
until the day it finally prevails…This moment belongs to the people,
particularly the young people, of the Middle East.”19
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These and many other regional facts substantiate the
following points: First, the uprisings were against the regimes having
the same cultural identity but suppressing their civil rights and human
dignity. Unlike Huntington’s expectation, the public’s demands in the
streets were not “cultural identity,” and the activists were asking for
the support of human rights organizations and the West, rather than
chanting against or seeking to clash with the West. Second, as earlier
mentioned, the public demands for democracy and human dignity do
not necessarily mean that the activists have ignored their cultural
identity. Most of the activists and participants in the uprisings, without
undermining their native cultural identity, have been fighting for their
dignity and human rights, that is, for the elements of their universal culture. In
fact, their clashes with their Muslim tyrants for their human dignity
and freedom reveal the alliance rather than the clash with cultures.
Brzezinski, unlike Huntington, believes that the moderate Islamic
identity is compatible with democratization:
Turkey’s internal democratization and
spread–modernization is evidence that neither
democratization nor modernization is
incompatible with Islamic religious traditions.
Such democratization is of great importance to
the political future of the Islamic world as well as
to global stability… A Turkey that is increasingly
Western, secular, and yet also Islamic—and that
exploits its territorial and cultural connection with
the people of the old Ottoman Empire and post
Soviet Central Asian states – could be a Turkey
that underestimates the appeal of Islamic
extremism and enhances regional stability …
(2012:138).
The alliance of culture/civilizations was proposed at the 59th
General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005 co-sponsored by
Turkish Prime-Minister Tayyip Erdogan and the President of Spain,
Luis Rodrigues.20 Finally, Huntington’s view on “Islamic identity” as a
stable entity which “has been a seesaw for 1,300 years” ignores the
dynamism of human identity. Social psychology teaches us that
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identity is a dynamic human quality that evolves during any
socialization process. People may develop and change their identity
based on their religion, nationality, language, or human values. The
young Muslims, because of their growing access to ideals of human
and civil rights in the West during the last several decades, are gaining
awareness of their human and civil rights and evolving their identity.
This identity transformation sometimes involves conflicting cultural
elements. Gallop Polls of the Islamic world or Pew Surveys have
revealed a variety of conflicting cultural elements among Middle
Eastern Muslims. For example, Pew surveys show 82% of Egyptians
supported stoning as a punishment for adultery, while 90% supported
freedom of religion, and 70% were against censorship, or a Gallop
Poll shows “some 93% of the those surveyed called themselves
‘moderate’ Muslims” and the remaining 7% identified themselves as
‘radicals’ but “admire the West for its democracy and freedom.
However, they do not want such things imposed on them.”21
WHY HUNTINGTON STRESSES ON THE “CLASHES” OF
CIVILIZATIONS
“The Clash of Civilizations” stands on, at least, three
questionable assumptions. First, Huntington overestimates Muslim
fundamentalism:While he says the underlying problem for the West is
Islam, not Islamic fundamentalism, his evidence mostly comes from
extremists. For example, Huntington says, “…it is hardly surprising
that following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an intercivilizational quasi
war developed between Islam and the West” (1996:216).22 He adds,
“Khomeini declared, quite accurately, that ‘Iran is effectively at war
with America, and Qadhafi regularly proclaims holy war against the
West’” (1996:216). For Huntington, this renewed war between Islam
and the West started with “perceived ‘gharbzadegi’ or Westoxication”
among Muslims during the1980s and 1990s (1996:213). Huntington
quotes from Barry Buzan and Bernard Lewis showing the West’s
perception of the clash between the two cultures, concluding that the
West “prepared not only to support a societal Cold War with Islam,
but to adopt policies that encourages it” (1996:213).
The uprisings’ characteristics and their demands, including
the Iranian green movement, have proven otherwise. There was no
single expression or demand in the uprisings to show hostile attitudes
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of the people toward the West, including the United States. During
the 9/11/ 2001 incident, despite the hostile attitude of the Iranian
regime, thousands of Iranian people displayed sympathy toward the
United States people and against terrorism by holding a public
candlelight vigil. Dunn asserts after all, “Osama bin Laden’s attempts
to provoke a ‘clash of civilizations’ have ‘turned out to be a
spectacular failure.’ One can find evidence for this in the Iranians who
gathered outside of the US embassy in Tehran on the night of 9/11,
not to chant anti-US slogans but to offer their sympathies, or to the
enduring anti-war movement in the West. These examples are
antitheses on the ‘clash of civilization’…” (2006-7:07). During the
recent regional uprisings, the people not only called for their human
and civil rights (so called Western Values) but asked for Western help
to fight against their Muslim leaders who suppressed their rights.
Despite Qadhafi’s rhetoric, Libyan people overthrew him by Western
supports. Thousands of Muslims have died in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen, Libya, and Syria, not in clashes between Islam and the West,
but in clashes with their Muslim governments with the same cultural
identity. Furthermore, Huntington uses “Westoxication” a few times
to display the renewal of the Muslim hated toward the West. The term
“gharbzadegi” (Westoxication) originally came from Iran during 1970s
when a leftist writer (Jalal Al-e Ahmad) published a book with the
same title which attracted the attention of some educated people
during the Cold-War era. However, the book and the author’s ideas
were later strongly challenged by almost all intellectuals and educated
publics, especially after the 1979 Iranian revolution. Finally, unlike
Huntington’s expectation, fundamentalist regimes, such as the Islamic
Republic of Iran, are not the role models for the uprisings. Dalacoura
concludes that “the uprisings are a confirmation that the appeal of the
Iranian Islamist model is declining….In those cases where Islamists
may benefit directly from the unfolding political changes, as in Tunisia
and Egypt, they look for inspiration to the success of Turkey’s AKP
rather than Iran” (2012:79). The same has been confirmed by other
Middle Eastern experts that Muslim Brotherhood “are realizing that if
they cannot get jobs and the economy going, people will not like them
either…They look to Turkey for advice not to Islamic Theology of
Iran. They know that they have more to learn from Turkey than from
Saudi Arabia or Iran.” “Islamic slogans were hardly visible during
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uprisings even though Islamists were there.” They agreed on the
words “civil state”; as the new buzz words.23
Second, Huntington reduces the meaning of culture: If one limits
the meaning of culture and civilization to “religion plus language,”
Huntington is right none of the participants in the regional uprisings
was demanding to change their religion or language. However,
Huntington, by emphasizing religion and language as the core of
culture, underestimated the meaning and evolving nature of culture.
Culture has a much broader definition than “religion plus language.”
Culture consists of all the shared products of human society. These
products are of two basic kinds, material and non-material. Some of
these “shared products” have been universal because of common
natural environment. However, cultural universals do not merely
derive from common natural environment; rather, social and cultural
contacts with other civilizations have been the major source of
acculturation. The demands in the uprisings revealed the evolving
nature of generational culture, including their human and civil values and
rights. During the uprising, the participants revealed their answer to
Huntington’s question, “who am I.” The answer was, like all other
people, I am a citizen and a human being and asking for my rights, before
putting any emphasis on my language or religion.
Finally, Huntington under-powers cultural dynamism: Rejecting
universal culture, Huntington acknowledges the “universal nature of
modernization.” Modernization comprises “industrialization,
urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education…, social
mobilization, and more…” (1996:68). But surprisingly, he ignores or
underestimates the roles of increasing literacy, education, social
mobilization, and sciences on cultural changes and on the mentality of
people, especially on youth. Universal new technology such as
internet, Twitter, Face-book, YouTube, and so on, as evidence of
modernization, has facilitated cultural exchanges and exposed “universal
human culture” to new generations in the Muslim world.
Huntington’s theory, the clash of civilizations, underestimates the
significant impacts of modernization on the mentality and culture of
people, especially on younger generations. The interactive nature of
new technologies and their accessibility to the public, especially to
educated people, are exposing and educating them to their human and
civil rights. Bernard Lewis is right when he says it is not easy to create
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free institutions “in a political culture where religion and ethics have
been more concerned with duties than with rights, in which
obedience to legitimate authority is a religious obligation as well as
political necessity…” (1994:47). However, both Huntington and Lewis
have underestimated the dynamic and speed of cultural
transformation in the new technology era within the Muslim nations.
The time-unit of cultural change within new generations, including
Muslims, no longer is a century or even a decade, but rather years. The
characteristics of social relationships and mentality of one generation
becomes culture of the new generation after a few or more years.
Elaborating on William Wilson’s (2010) proposition on today’s
dynamic societies, social structure and mentality of one generation
becomes culture of the newer generation.
CONCLUSIONS
As Salam said, the Twenty-First Century in the Middle East is
the era of democratization; “political Islam is evolving within the context of a
democracy” (2011:02). Such a transformation, however, is not and will
not be peaceful, especially between the West and fundamentalist
Muslims such as Al-Qaida in the region, and/or the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This confirms and is consistent with
Huntington’s “the fault-line” conflicts. It is, however, part of the
regional reality. The uprisings have revealed an evolving new reality
reflecting political, civil, and human right-awakening in the region,
which is establishing a new culture, or universal culture along with
their native cultures. This evolving new culture was underestimated/
ignored in Huntington’s clashes of civilizations. The uprisings have
proved a significant shift in the tendency and attitudes of young
Muslims toward the West, viewing “Western culture” (the human and
civilian culture credited with blooming in the West) as their “alliance”
and supporter of their human and civil rights. The new Muslim
generations who have worried Huntington because of their “cultural
identity” turned out to be the agent of this cultural transformation in
the region. Huntington says the Post-Cold War era would not be
ideological, rather “clashes of civilizations,” but his cultural
reductionism in the final analysis turns the “clash of civilizations” to
clashes between two ideological extremists, Muslim extremism and neoconservatism; the following diagram displays his reductionism. 24
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Civilization → Culture → Religion plus Language → Religion →
Fundamentalism
Civilization is originally reduced to culture; culture reduced to
religion plus language; because there are no clashes over the languages, in
reality, “the clashes of civilizations” is nothing more than “the clashes
of religions,” more specifically between Islam and the West; finally his
documentations are almost entirely focused on Islamist extremism.
Of course, we should not glorify “Arab Spring” and celebrate
assumed upcoming democratic and accountable states respecting their
human and civil rights. The uprisings were started by young secular
activists who rejected both US-backed dictators, such as Mubarak, and
religious extremism like Iranian theocracy. The overthrow of tyrants,
however, is much easier than building democratic institutions and
mentality. Furthermore, there are socio-economic groups, both secular
and religious, in all of those nations that are eager to restore their
status or to gain power and resources. The uprisings may result in
other tyrannical regimes or fundamentalist theocracies as it did in Iran.
However, as the evidence and the public demands revealed, the
uprisings displayed many positive signs of “awakening.” For the first
time, the people in the street, regardless of their religion, were demanding
their rights and fighting for their human dignity, not for religious or
“Cultural Identity.” The uprising and their public demands have
proved that freedom, democracy, and civil rights belong to all human
beings. They have gained the status of “cultural universal” in
sociology.
Furthermore, if there is any clash or clashes between the
Islamic and the Western cultures or civilizations, as proposed by
Huntington for the early decades of the Twenty-First Century, the
uprisings have revealed it is not necessarily between the West and Islam,
rather between two generations within the Islamic civilization. The new
generation in the Muslim nations are awakening, but not
“Islamic-Awakening” alleged by the Iranian “supreme leader”
Khamanei; rather “political-awakening” (Brzezinski, 2012) or more
meticulously, “human and civil rights-awakening.” This awareness
undermines and challenges the status and power of tyrannical leaders,
either religious, such as the Islamic Republic leaders, or secular
tyrannies as in the cases of the Arab Spring. Hamed Abdel-Samad
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made the following remark on the clashes of the Islamic and the
Western civilizations.
As far as I can tell, the ‘clash of
civilizations’ seized upon by the late Samuel
Huntington has long become reality. But it is
important to realize that it take place not only
between Islam and the West, as many suspected it,
but also within the Islamic world itself. It is an
inter-Islamic clash between individualism and
conformity pressure, between continuity and
innovation, modernity and the past.25
In Abdel-Samad’s view, the Islamic world is in crisis. “I view
today’s Islam as seriously ill, both culturally and socially, as in
retreat.” Fundamentalism and religiously motivated violence reflect
“merely nervous reactions to this retreat” (See: Endnote 24). Almost
the similar remark was made by Wafa Sultan on the nature of clashes
between Muslim fundamentalism and the West.
The clash we are witnessing around the
world is not a clash of religions or a clash of
civilizations. It is a clash between two opposites,
between eras. It is a clash between a mentality that
belongs to the Middle Ages and another mentality
that belongs to the 21th century. It is a clash
between civilization and backwardness, between
the civilized and the primitive, between barbarity
and rationality. It is a clash between freedom and
oppression, between democracy and dictatorship.
It is a clash between human rights, on the one
hand, and violation of the rights, on the other
hand. It is a clash between those who treat women
like beasts, and those who treat them like human
beings.” (Al-Jazeera TV, Feb 21, 2006). 26
While both Abdel-Samad’s view and Sultan’s remark are
their own individual and intellectual assessments of the Islamic world
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and not the public Muslim mentality and social reality, they reveal,
however, that the cultural alliance or the growing universal human culture
along with their native culture are awakening them to their human and
civil rights. Such awareness makes them to question, reinterpret, and
sometimes react to their religiously imposed “duties,” and this is a
promising sign of cultural transformation.
Finally, the economic hardship, especially higher
unemployment rates among the educated youth as well tremendous
socio-economic inequality as the driving force and the major immediate
cause of the uprisings should not be ignored. For example, according
to the United Nations’ Human Development Research Paper (SalehiIsfahani 2010), youth are the most educated segment of the
population in the region, yet suffer greater exclusion for economic and
civic life. The same report shows, unlike the West where education is
productive, the unemployment rates are higher among the most educated people in
the region, especially among youth. “If we accept that lower unemployment
rates in the middle and high-income countries are indications of
higher productivity of their educated workers, the fact that MENA
[Middle Eastern and North Africa] workers with secondary and
tertiary education suffer greater unemployment suggests that
education in MENA is less productive than elsewhere” (13). The
Iranian labor-minister recently reported that “the unemployment rate
among the university graduates is ten times higher than the ones with
high-school or lower education.” 27 However, despite the economic
hardship and higher unemployment rates among the educated youth,
freedom, democracy, and respect of human dignity were the most
chanted and expressed demands among the activists and youth who
participated in the uprisings. This is a notable lesson that most
socio-political activists as well as the public have learned from history,
especially from the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It is not possible
to achieve economic justice through tyrannical regimes (so called “dictatorship
of proletariat” in the communist nations); democracy, freedom, and
respect of human and civil rights are preconditions to gain better
economic justice and socio-economic equality.
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Endnotes
1.http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Five-YearsAfter-911The-Clash-of-Civilizations-Revisited.aspx. See also New
York Times (October 13, 2001).
2.The core of Edward Said critiques on clashes of civilizations can be
found in his earlier writings, especially in his popular thesis
“essentialism” vs. “non-essentialism.” Said challenges the idea that
Western Culture is rationale, developed, and superior while the
Middle Eastern and North African Cultures are undeveloped, static,
and irrational. For more see, Edward Said (1979) Orientalism.
3.“The Clash of Civilizations” is “a perfect paradigm, a thing that
defines its own field of investigation, that defines its concepts, that
makes predictions, that even has its own concept of falsification, then
the perfect example is astrology. The problem is, astrology is nonsense” (2002:195). For more detailed view of Halliday on September
11, 2001, see his excellent book: Two Hours That Shook the World. 11
September 2001, Causes and Consequences.
4.Fred Halliday (1996) classifies the Muslims’ responses to modern
human right values into five categories—assimilation, appropriation,
particularism, confrontation, incompatibility.
5.For more on the 2009 election fraud and counter claim, see for
example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Iranian_presidential_election,_2009
or
http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2009/06/iran-electionsclaims-and-counterclaims-analyzed.html
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6.For more see, Charles Kurzman (2012) or the following sources:
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FMES%
2
F
M
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S
4
4
_
0
1
%
2FS0020743811001346a.pdf&code=b7d911d6728c99a628e851f47f40
8cbf or http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/
Voices.php/2011/01/31/iran-s-green-movement-still-inspires

7.http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global Viewpoint/2011/0615/Iran-s-Green-Movement-has-actuallyachieved-its-goal
8.For more see:http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?
title=Arab_Spring
9.See: Esam Al-Amin. 2011. “Understanding Tunisia’s Election
Results.”In International Policy Digest:October 28-30 (http://
www.internationalpolicydigest.org/author/esam-al-amin/)
10.http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353330/Egypt-protests
-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-protests.html
11.http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137053/fouad-ajami/thearab-spring-at-one
12.http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136699/anthony billingsley/writing-constitutions-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring
13.http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=43866&Cr=syria&Cr1
14.http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?
pageid=438&n=8216arab-spring-forces-looking-to-turkey-rather-than
-iran-model8217-2011-10-28
15.Huntington intentionally underestimated the growth of “nonreligious,” atheists, and agnostics. The same table that shows the
growing Muslims from 12.4% in 1900 to 19.2% in 2000 (estimated);
Christianity from 26.9% in 1900 to 29.9% in 2000 (estimated) also
shows the percentage of non-religious people has grown up from
0.2% in 1900 to 17.1% in 2000 (estimated) and atheists from 0% to
4.2% in 2000 (estimated). A 2008 Gallup poll showed that 6% of the
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US population believed that no god or universal spirit exists. The
most recent ARIS report, released March 9, 2009, found in 2008, 34.2
million Americans (15.0%) claim no religion, of which 1.6% explicitly
describes itself as atheist or agnostic, nearly double the previous 2001
ARIS survey figure of 0.9%.The highest occurrence of "nones",
according to the 2008 ARIS report, reside in Vermont, with 34%
surveyed. The latest statistics show that a lack of religious identity
increased in every US state between 1990 and 2008.
16.The Nobel Peace Prize 2011: http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobelprizes/peace/laureates/2011/karman-lecture_en.html
17.See for example, Stephen Zunes (2011), Egypt: Lessons in
Democracy:http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/egypt-lessons
-in-democracy
18.Barbara Diesner, Roland Berger Stiftung (2011). Roland Berger
Human Dignity Award 2011 presented to Radhia Nasraoui, the
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information and Mazen
Darwish:http://www.human-dignity-forum.org/2011/11/rolandberger-preis-fuer-menschenwuerde-an-frau-radhia-nasraoui-das-arabic
-network-for-human-rights-information-und-herrn-mazen-darwishv
e
r
l
i
e
h
e
n
/
19.Citation:http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitorsview/2012/0109/Arab-Spring-justice-but-a-free-pass-for-Yemen-sSaleh
20.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_of_Civilizations
21.Pew Research Center Publications:Egypt, democracy, and Islam.
01/31,2011:http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protestsdemocracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-extremism and also see:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7267100.stm
22. It is quasi for three reasons. First, all of Islam has not been
fighting all the West… Second, it has been fought with limited
means:terrorism from one side and air power, covert action, and
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economic sanctions on the other. Third, it is a quasi war because while
the violence has been continuing, it has not been continuous.”
23.See daily News:Arab Wave Sweeps Iran model out, Turkey ‘In’” 10
-28-2011:http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?
pageid=438&n=8216arab-spring-forces-looking-to-turkey-rather-than
-iran-model8217-2011-10-28
24.Jonathan Cook (2008) in his book, Israel and the Clash of Civilization
has an extensive discussion on the issue of neo conservatives in the
Unites States and in Israel to turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into
the clashes of cultures. “Nonetheless, Israel and the neocons [neoconservatives] may have believed that there were benefits to be
derived from the growth of Islamic radicalism too…. The question of
what to do with the Palestinians has increasingly been tied to the
question of what the West should do about the Islamic extremism.
Israel has therefore been nurturing a view of itself as on the frontiers
of the West in an epoch-changing clash of civilizations. In particular,
Israel and the neocons have seized the opportunity presented by the
war ‘war on terror’ to reshape the Middle East in their own
interests” (p. xv).
25.http://www.theglobalist.com/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=8696
26.Sultan, Wafa (Al-Jazeera TV, Feb 21, 2006 http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=niC9WKDrJk&feature=player_embedded or http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=UFLc5IX8x6k
27.For example, the unemployment rate in USA for 2011 were 2.4%
for professional degree, 2.5% for doctoral degrees, 3.6% for masters’
degree, 4.9% bachelor’s degree, 6.8% associated degree…9.4% for
high school diploma, and 14.1% for less than high school diploma
(BLS:http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm). For Iranian
reports see:http://www.mihan.net/press/?=7035&print=1.For the
United Nations reports on education and the unemployment see:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/
HDRP_2010_26.pdf.
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